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defer post-petition rent payments, especially in the early months of the Pandemic.3 However, 
rent abatement is not a guarantee in chapter 11.4  
This Memorandum addresses the varying views of bankruptcy courts with respect to rent 
abatement. Part I examines the different rationales based in the Bankruptcy Code or contract 
doctrines for rent abatement. Part II illustrates examples of bankruptcy courts’ approach to rent 
abatement motions throughout different stages of the Pandemic.   
I. Bankruptcy Courts Advance Different Rationales on Abatement Motions Based in 
Statute or Contract Doctrines 
 
Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to “timely” perform its lease 
obligations “until such lease is assumed or rejected.”5 If a debtor shows cause, courts may extend 
the debtor’s time for performance by up to 60 days.6 Additionally, section 105 of the Bankruptcy 
Code allows courts to use their equitable powers as "necessary or appropriate" to carry out the 
Bankruptcy Code provisions, including delaying payments.7 Bankruptcy courts have been faced 
with the issue of whether to allow rent abatement beyond the 60 days provided for in § 365(d)(3) 
because of a required government shutdown order caused by the Pandemic, and if such excuses 
performance under force majeure or “frustration of purpose” doctrines.8  
 
3 See In re Modell’s Sporting Goods, No. 20-14179 [Docket No. 166], ¶ 3(b) (Bankr. D.N.J., March 27, 2020); see 
also In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. 196, 201–02 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2020). 
4 See In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 352–53. 
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). 
6 See id. 
7 See 11 U.S.C. §105 (2018). 
8 See In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 353–64; see also In re Hitz Restaurant Group, 616 B.R. 374, 377 
(Bankr. E.D. Ill., June 3, 2020). 
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Modell’s Sporting Goods was one of the first major retail debtors to have its rent abated 
for over 60 days beyond the petition date despite the express 60-day limitation in § 365(d)(3) of 
the Bankruptcy Code.9 On March 20, 2020, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued various stay-at-
home executive orders that restricted most retail businesses from operating.10 As a result, on 
March 27, 2020, pursuant to sections 105 and 305 (a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a 
court to dismiss or suspend a case if “the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better 
served,” Judge Vincent Papalia suspended Modell’s chapter 11 case pending in the District of 
New Jersey for 34 days.11 Debtors argued it could not conduct liquidation sales because of 
government-imposed restrictions that forced the closure of debtor's storefronts.12 During the 
suspension, Judge Papalia permitted the debtor to defer rent payments that were otherwise due 
under § 365(d)(3).13 Subsequently, the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Virginia 
granted similar relief.14 However, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Texas denied 
such relief, finding neither a statutory basis nor the doctrines of force majeure or frustration of 




9 See In re Modell’s Sporting Goods, No. 20-14179 [Docket No. 166], ¶ 3(b) (Bankr. D.N.J., Mar. 27, 2020). 
10 See Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8). 
11 See In re Modell’s, 20-14179, p. 5–6 (N.J. 03/27/20) at 3(b); see also 11 U.S.C. §305(a)(1) (2018). 
12 See In re Modell’s, 20-14179, p. 5–6 (N.J. 03/27/20) at 3(b). 
13 See id. 
14 See In re Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 615 B.R. 196, 205 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2020). 
15 See In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 364. 
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A. Divided: Statutory Basis for Delay of Rent Payments 
 
Like Modell’s, in In re Piet 1 Imports, Judge Kevin R. Huennekens of the Eastern District 
of Virginia found a statutory basis for temporary rent reduction during the pandemic.16 Judge 
Huennekens reasoned that a debtor's failure to pay rent timely under a commercial property lease 
results in an administrative expense claim payable on the effective date of a plan.17 The claim does 
not have super-priority status.18 If the plan provides for payment of administrative expense claims 
on the plan effective date, payment is timely.19 Furthermore, the court determined that, to the 
extent that adequate protection is requested, the debtor’s “deferred payment of rent while they 
continue the use of the leased premises[] does not decrease the value of any Lessor’s interest in 
the property.”20 The court further noted that “COVID-19 presents a temporary, unforeseen, and 
unforeseeable glitch in the administration of the Debtors’ Bankruptcy Cases.”21  
But in In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., the a Texas bankruptcy court denied the debtor's 
motion for a rent abatement where the debtor asserted that government regulations reducing the 
number of patrons or terminating operations prevented the debtor from functioning.22 Judge 
Marvin Isgur of the Southern District of Texas concluded that § 365(d)(3) unambiguously 
“prohibits the [c]ourt from allowing extensions of more than sixty days after the order for relief.”23 
Furthermore, the “[c]ourt cannot override [this] statutory mandate.”24 Therefore, according to the 
 
16 See In re Pier 1 Imports, 615 B.R. at 196. 
17 See id. 
18 See id.  (citing In re Circuit City, 447 B.R. 475 at 511). 
19 See id. 
20 In re Pier 1 Imports, 615 B.R. at 203 (explaining that a landlord may be entitled to adequate protection under §§ 
361 and 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code if the value of their interest in real estate decreases); see also 11 U.S.C. § § 
361, 363(e) (2018). 
21 Id. 
22 See 625 B.R. at 364. 
23 Id. at 352 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3)). 
24 See id. at 353 (citing In re Mirant Corp., 378F.3d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A court's powers under § 105(a) are 
not unlimited as that section only ‘authorizes bankruptcy courts to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the 
substantive provisions of the Code,’ and does not permit those courts to ‘act as roving commissions to do equity.’”)). 
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court, the Bankruptcy Code does not permit bankruptcy courts to “equitably alter CEC’s state law 
rent obligations.”25  
B. The Force Majeure and Frustration of Purpose Doctrines 
After analyzing the statutory framework in In re CEC Entertainment, the court also did not 
excuse performance under force majeure and frustration of purpose doctrines. If either the lease 
or state law (i.e., a force majeure clause) allows the debtor to abate or reduce rent payments, then 
a debtor’s “obligation to perform under § 365(d)(3) will reflect such abatement or reductions.”26 
The doctrine of frustration of purpose “excuses a party’s nonperformance when circumstances 
beyond the parties’ control frustrate the purpose of the deal.”27 The remedy is usually the recission 
of the contract.28 Unlike a force majeure clause, “frustration relates to the purpose of a contract, 
as opposed to a party's actual inability to perform.”29 If parties included a frustration of purpose 
provision or included risks arising from a frustrating event in a contract, then “they may not invoke 
the doctrine of frustration to escape their obligations.”30 
In In re CEC Entertainment, the court examined the force majeure clauses in the debtor’s 
leases to determine if performance of the lease obligations was not excused.31 The court found that 
although the force majeure clauses may have given the debtor relief in some circumstances, they 
all “expressly provide that a force majeure event cannot excuse prompt payment of rental 
charges.”32 Next, the court examined the debtor’s frustration of purpose argument, noting that the 
remedy under state law for frustration of purpose is recission, not rent abatement.33 Furthermore, 
 
25 Id. at 351. 
26 See id. at 353. 
27 Id. at 357.   
28 See id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 361 (citing Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal.2d 666 (Cal. 1969)). 
31 See id. at 353. 
32 Id. at 357. 
33 See id. 
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the force majeure clauses in the debtor’s North Carolina and Washington state leases superseded 
the frustration of purpose doctrine because the parties specifically allocated the risk of unusual 
governmental regulation when the parties expressly agreed that exceptional government regulation 
does not relieve CEC's obligation to pay rent.34 Two of three of the debtor’s California leases 
excused most nonperformance caused by government regulations but expressly required rent 
payments notwithstanding frustrating restrictions.35 The third California lease also superseded the 
frustration of purpose doctrine because it contained an anti-force majeure clause that did not refer 
to government regulations.36 Instead, the anti-force majeure clause stated that a party is not 
excused from performance if that party's performance was prevented or delayed “by reasons of 
strike, labor troubles, acts of God, or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of either 
party.”37 The court explained that the doctrine should only apply to cases of "extreme hardship," 
where the "frustrating event was not reasonably foreseeable, and the value of the counter-
performance is nearly totally destroyed."38 Therefore, the court held that government regulations 
that render performance unprofitable do not frustrate a lease.39  
Alternatively, an Eastern District of Illinois bankruptcy court analyzed the force majeure 
clause in a restaurant debtor’s lease and held that the impact of the government shutdown order 
caused by the pandemic excused performance, at least for the period the restaurant had to suspend 
its on-premises dining.40 To determine whether the Governor of Illinois’ executive order 
suspending restaurant service triggered the force majeure clause in the debtor’s lease, the court 
turned to Illinois state law which states that a force majeure clause will only excuse contractual 
 
34 See id. at 359.   
35 See id. at 356. 
36 See id. 
37 In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 356. 
38 Id. at 363. 
39 See id. at 364. 
40 See In re Hitz Restaurant Group, 616 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. June 3, 2020).   
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performance if the triggering event cited by the nonperforming party was, in fact, the proximate 
cause of that party's nonperformance.41 The court found that the force majeure clause in the lease 
was a clear result of Governor Pritzker’s executive order because: (1) it was a government action 
contemplated by the language of the clause, (2) the order undoubtedly “hindered” the debtor’s 
ability to perform, and (3) the order was “unquestionably the proximate cause of Debtor's inability 
to pay rent, at least in part, because it prevented Debtor from operating normally and restricted its 
business to take-out, curbside pick-up, and delivery.”42  
II. Bankruptcy Courts Grant Abatement Motions During the Pandemic  
 
Modell’s was the first significant debtor to have its rent abatement motion granted in the 
very early stages of the Pandemic.43 Shortly after that, other bankruptcy courts also granted 
debtors’ motions requesting relief from rent owed under § 365(d)(3).44 As the Pandemic 
continued, bankruptcy courts also found that rent abatement resulting from Pandemic-related 
government regulations is not a guarantee.45  
A. Early Months of the Pandemic  
True Religion, a denim apparel retail company, filed for relief under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code shortly after the initial Pandemic stay-at-home orders were imposed.46 On its 
first day of filing, the debtor filed an abatement motion under § 365(d)(3), seeking a 60-day 
 
41 See id. at 377 (citing Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Co-op., Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App. Cit. 1984)). 
42 Id. at 377–78. 
43 See In re Modell’s, 20-14179, p. 5–6 (N.J. 03/27/20) at 3(b). 
44 See In re Pier 1 Imports, 615 B.R. at 205. 
45 See In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 364. 
46 See In re True Religion Apparel Inc., Case No. 20-1091, [Docket No. 27], ¶ 3 (Bankr. D. Del. April 13, 2020). 
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suspension of rent payments.47 The court granted the motion, citing the “unprecedented and 
unforeseen outbreak of COVID-19, the national state of emergency declared by President Trump 
on March 13, 2020, pursuant to the Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency . . . and the 
numerous state orders that limit or preclude the Debtors’ operations.”48 However, the same 
bankruptcy court denied an asset-purchaser’s motion to stop paying rent while maintaining 
possession of stores, notwithstanding the Pandemic.49 The Forever 21 decision indicates that a 
court may only be willing to grant abatement motions if the deferment directly benefits a debtor, 
not a third-party purchaser.50  
B. Late Spring: Initial Reopening of Retail Stores  
In May 2020, J. Crew, also a clothing retail company, sought court approval on the first 
day of its case to defer its commercial lease obligation for 60 days.51 In this case, the Eastern 
District of Virginia bankruptcy court, in granting the debtor’s rent abatement motion, ordered that 
it would stay any action seeking to enforce lease obligations during the 60 days, and that no 
adequate protection payments were required.52 Despite that the court’s order granting the 
abatement motion was around the time when many stay-at-home orders had expired or were about 
to expire, and retail stores were reopening, and that the debtor was in the process of reopening 
 
47 See id. 
48 Id. p. 1 (Del. 04/13/20) at 1–2. 
49 See In re Forever 21 Inc., No. 19-12122 [Docket No. 1115], ¶ 17 (Bankr. D. Del. April 1, 2020). 
50 See Paul J. Ricotta & Kaitlin R.Walsh, Mothballing Motions from Retail Debtors to Avoid Rent Payments Due to 
COVID-19 Pandemic, XXXIX, No. 8 ABI JOURNAL (2020); see also In re Modell’s, 20-14179, p. 5–6 (N.J. 
03/27/20) at 3(b) (granting debtors rent abatement motion). 
51 See In re Chinos Holdings Inc., No. 20-32181 [Docket No. 23], ¶ 3 (Bankr. E.D. Va., May 4, 2020). 
52 See id. p. 1 (Va. 05/04/20) at 2 (finding that the timing of the debtor’s filing did not diminish the effects of the 
pandemic and that the debtor was permitted to use the tools available under the Bankruptcy Code, including post-
petition rent deferral). 
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stores, the court noted that sales had been "far short" of pre-pandemic sale numbers.53 Since the 
debtor was not generating a considerable amount of income from the stores that had already 
reopened, most of the debtor's employees remained furloughed.54  
Similar to J. Crew, in May 2020, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas 
granted J.C. Penny’s abatement motion, allowing the debtor to defer approximately $34 million of 
post-petition rent even though the debtor had admittedly reopened 474 stores and expected to open 
another 340 within a matter of weeks.55 The debtor proposed that a rent deferment would allow 
the debtor to negotiate rent-relief with the landlords.56  
C. Developing Case: Ruby Tuesday 
In November 2020, Ruby Tuesday, a casual restaurant chain, filed for chapter 11 relief 
with the Delaware bankruptcy court and requested temporary rent abatement for restaurants that 
were either closed or had limited operations because of pandemic-related government 
restrictions.57 Unlike previous debtors, Ruby Tuesday sought deferment until government 
restrictions had been lifted.58 The debtor requested an expedited adjudication of state law issues, 
like the enforcement of force majeure clauses.59 Judge John T. Dorsey approved the debtor's rent 
abatement litigation schedule, which bifurcated rent abatement litigation into two phases: the 
determination phase and the quantifying phase.60 Shortly after that, the debtor filed five adversary 
complaints against its landlords, arguing that pandemic-related government regulations: (1) 
triggered force majeure clauses that relieve debtors of rent obligations, (2) frustrated the 
 
53 See id. (citing In re Chinos, 20-32181, p. 1 (Va. 05/04/20) at 2). 
54 See id. 
55 See In re J.C. Penney Co. Inc., No. 20-20182 [Docket No. 338], ¶ 1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 28, 2020). 
56 See id. (citing to In re J.C. Penney, 20-20182 [Docket No. 349] p. 2 (Tex. 05/28/20) at 2).  
57 See In re RTI Holding Company, LLC, No. 20-12456, [Docket No. 145], ¶ 1 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 16, 2020). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 20-12456 p. 13 (10/16/20) at 29. 
60 See id. 20-12456 [Docket No. 689] (12/09/20) at 29). 
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Some bankruptcy courts have granted debtors the ability to defer post-petition rent 
payments that would otherwise be due and owing under § 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code in 
response to debtors' pressing circumstances due to the Pandemic. In the early months of the 
Pandemic, this was especially true.62 However, in In re CEC Entertainment, filed later in the 
pandemic, the court denied rent deferment requests despite government-imposed restrictions on 







61 See Seward & Kissell, LLP, Rent Abatement Litigation Could Continue to Alter Landlord-Tenant Landscape, 
(Jan. 6, 2021) https://www.sewkis.com/publications/rent-abatement-litigation-could-continue-to-alter-landlord-
tenant-landscape/ (citing In re RTI Holding Co., 20-12456 [Docket No. 724 p.1 (10/23/20) at 3); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(b)(1) (2018) (providing that a court must allow a claim against a debtor unless “such claim is unenforceable 
against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law,” which allows debtors to 
assert contractual arguments or state law defenses to bankruptcy claims). 
62 See In re Modell’s, 20-14179, p. 5–6 (N.J. 03/27/20) at 3(b); see also In re True Religion, 20-1091, p. 1 (Del. 
04/13/20) at 1–2.; In re Forever 21, 19-12122, p. (Del. 04/01/20) at 17. 
63 See In re CEC Entertainment, 625 B.R. at 364. 
